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INTUITIONISM AND LOGICAL TOLERANCE
Tradition is classical. Surely, nothing could be more pleonastic than that? The
logical tradition, certainly, was squarely classical from Bolzano to Carnap, with,
say, Frege, Moore, Russell and the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus as intermediaries.
Propositions are construed as being in themselves true-or-false. Indeed, in this
tradition, a declarative sentence S expresses a proposition (or is a proposition,
depending on what version of the theory that is adopted) by being true-or-false. So
the meaningfulness of a sentence consists in its being true-or-false. But S is true-or-
false, or so they say, only when S is true, or when S is false. On the classical
account the presumption of bivalence is built into the very notion of meaning-
fulness: there is no difference between asserting that Λ is a proposition and asserting
that A is true-or-false. The matter came to the fore in the foundations of set theory.
In his first attempt at giving an application criterion for sets Cantor noted:
Eine Mannigfaltigkeit (ein Inbegriff, eine Menge) von Elementen, die irgendwelcher
Begriffssphäre angehören, nenne ich wohldefiniert, wenn auf Grund ihrer Definition und
infolge des logischen Prinzips vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten es als intern bestimmt
angesehen werden muss, sowohl ob irgendein derselben Begriffssphäre angehöriges Objekt
zu der gedachten Mannigfaltigkeit gehört oder nicht, wie auch, ob zwei zur Mannigfaltigkeit
gehörige Objekte trotz formaler Unterschiede in der Art des Gegebenseins einander gleich
sind oder nicht.'
Here Cantor's reference to the Law of the Excluded Third is, in my opinion, of the
above kind, where meaningfulness, rather than logicality, is at issue: when α is a
set, and a an object from the right 'concept sphere', α e α has to be a well-put
statement, that is, it must be determinately true-or-false.2
The passage continues:
Im allgemeinen werden die betreffenden Entscheidungen nicht mit den zu Gebote stehenden
Methoden oder Fähigkeiten in Wirklichkeit sicher und genau ausführbar sein; daraufkommt
es aber hierdurch nicht an, sondern allein auf die interne Determination, welche in konkreten
Fällen, wo die Zwecke fordern, durch Vervollkommnung der Hilfsmittel zu einer aktuellen
(externen) Determination auszubilden ist.
The issue concerning the actual execution of methods of evaluation and decision
was a bone of contention between Cantor and Kronecker. The Cantorian point of
view was followed by Zermelo in his axiomatization, where definite Eigenschaften
were used in the formulation of the Axiom der Aussonderung? Similarly, Frege
imposed a very strict sharpness condition of complete determination on his pro-
positional functions ("concepts"). Also he allowed for the possibility that human
agents might not be able to execute the required decision.4
Wittgenstein stressed similar points hi the Tractatus. A sentence must have true-
or-false bipolarity in order to be able to say anything. The possibility of human
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decision, at least in principle, was of central importance to him, though. For a
Satz S it is an internal matter, that is, part of its Satzsein, that it fixes reality on
yes-or-no (4.023). Therefore, that it does so, can be computed by syntactic
calculation am Symbol allein (6.126): according to the Tractatus, the Satz S has
a complete truth-table that can be mechanically generated and inspected hi order
to see whether it is a tautology or a contradiction.5 When S is neither a tautology
nor a contradiction, one cannot compute from the symbol alone whether S is true
or whether S is false; this can be done only for the borderline cases of tautologies
and contradictions. In the other cases, that is, for real Sätze with bipolar true-false
possibilities, we know a priori that S is true-or-false, but in order to know that 5
is true, or that S is false, a comparison with the world is called for (6.113).
The modern classical tradition in logic was inaugurated by Bolzano, who
sought for a firm basis on which to found the distinction between the subjective
and the objective. He availed himself of such a norm hi terms of Sätze an sich
(propositions) and then* being true or false, also an sich. This is brought out
clearly with respect to the crucial epistemological notions: proposition(al content),
judgement (made), and act of judgement (proof). To each corresponds a correct-
ness notion, as must be the case if objectivity is to be upheld:
(1) a proposition is true (wahr);
(2) a judgement made is correct (richtig);
(3) an act of proof/judgement is right [or valid] (gültig).
The notions themselves are related as hi the following diagram:
[act of proof]
[prepositional content]
A is true
[judgement made, theorem proved].6
The classical logical theory opts for (1) as the crucial, objectivity-conferring
notion of correctness: a proposition is, determinately, true or false. The Tightness
of the act (3) is reduced to the correctness of the judgement made (2):
the act of proving is right, only when the theorem proved is correct.
The correctness of the judgement made (2) is further reduced to (1):
the judgement A is true is correct, only when the proposition A really is true.7
The central role of (1) may well have been motivated ontologically: propositions
are true or false according to how things are in (mathematical or logical) reality.
Cantor and Wittgenstein, for example, adhere to such an ontological reduction.8
The position within the foundations of mathematics that is concomitant upon the
classical logical paradigm operates according to the equation:
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(*) Mathematics = Mathematical axioms + logical inference,
where logical inference proceeds according to the rules of classical logic. The
realist, or Platonist, ontology treats of mathematics as fixed, clear-cut, determined
and ready. The mathematical axioms hold because they are basic, primitive truths
about how matters stand within the mathematical ontology. The use of classical
logic, furthermore, is permitted within mathematics just because of the sharpness
of the mathematical ontology. The picture has been immortalised in Hardy's
[1929].
However, neither the classical view of the dependency of mathematics upon
logic, nor the classical order of logical priorities, is necessary. Brouwer reversed
the order of dependence, as well as the logical order of priority [1907], and he
criticised the unlimited use of classical logic [1908].
The three stages of constructivist criticism can be seen to follow a common
pattern. According to Kronecker, definitions must be decidable:
Die... aufgestellte Definition der Irreduktibilität entbehrt so lange einer sicheren Grundlage,
als nicht eine Methode angegeben ist, mittels deren bei einer bestimmten vorgelegten
Funktion entscheiden werden kann, ob dieselbe der aufgestellten Definition gemäss
irreduktibel ist oder nicht.9
In place of this complex Kronecker case of defining a property (prepositional
function) of algebraic functions, I consider the simpler case of functions on the
natural numbers. Clearly, we can come up with examples that do not allow for the
execution of the resulting number terms. Consider
(D ƒ(*)=*, 1
1 if the Rjemann Hypothesis is true
0 if the Riemann Hypothesis is false.
At present, though, no Auswertung off can be effected, irrespective of whatever
argument is supplied, since any completed evaluation would enable us to decide the
Riemann Hypothesis. Accordingly we here have an example of alleged number
terms, such as ƒ (14), that cannot be evaluated to the canonical form of an Arabic
numeral. This is too high a price to pay for the use of definitions by means of
undecided cases: in a stipulative definition it must be possible to eliminate the
definiendum in favour of the definiens. Strictly speaking, under present circum-
stances one is not even allowed to assert that/(14)eN. One can attempt to improve
upon this uncomfortable situation by considering the relation
R(xy)c?rop, for jceN
where
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R(x,y) =def (RH &jF=Nl)V(-RH & y=N0).10
One then readily verifies - using constructive means only - that
xeN, yeN, R(x, y) true, R(x, >>') true -+y=tjy' true.11
This consequence is one way of to view the internal determination demanded by
Cantor: a non-constructive proof of
(VjceN)(3yeN)R(;t,}>) true,
is readily obtained from the definition of R(x,_y) and an application of the law of
excluded middle to RH. In order to proceed to the corresponding external determi-
nation, however, one would need a constructive proof, which cannot be given
without deciding the Riemann Hypothesis.
In his [1906] criticism of impredicative definitions Poincaré noted that "les
définitions non predicatives ne peuvent pas être substituées au terme défini."12
A meaning-explanation for the second-order quantifier begins by stipulating that
(V JfeProp)/4 has to be proposition under the assumption that A is a prepositional
function from Prop to Prop, that is, that /ieProp, provided that XeProp. One then
has to explain, still under the same assumption, which proposition it is:
(VA"eProp)/i is true if and only if Λ[Ρ/Χ] is true, for each proposition P.
In the special case of (VAfePropJAOne obtains
(**) (VJfeProp^is true =def Ρ is true, for each proposition P.13
But (VA'eProp)X is (meant to be) a proposition, so it has to be considered on the
right-hand side. Accordingly (**) cannot serve as a definition of what it is for
(VXePropyXto be true: it does not allow for the elimination, whether effective or
not, of
... is true
when applied to the alleged proposition (VAfeProp)^. Note that this rejection of (**)
does not presuppose that the truth in question is classical. The argument applies
with equal force to second-order intuitionistic quantification.14
Of course Poincaré' s point about the non-eliminability remains valid in a
classical framework, say, that of Frege [1893]. There the explanation of the second-
order quantifier can be given a definition-by-cases form analogous to (I):
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4(II) (\/XeProp)A =def
The True, if A[P/X] = The True,
provided PeProp.
The False, otherwise.
The specialisation to (VAtPropXwill yet again be underdetermined along the lines
indicated above. Accordingly, the right-hand side of (II) does not determine a
meaning for (VXeProp)A. The definiendum cannot be eliminated - whether effec-
tively or not - in favour of its alleged definiens. Furthermore, in addition to this
impredicative underdetermination, the definition-by-cases has a non-decidable
condition. Thus, even if (II) had served to determine a fixed meaning, it still would
yield non-eliminable defined expressions that resist effective evaluation to primitive
form, just as in the simpler Kroneckerian case of (I), or the Brouwerian (III) below.
Also the criticism of classical first-order quantification in Brouwer [1908]
follows this pattern. When propositions are understood classically, that is, as ways
of presenting elements of the set of the truth-values {The True, The False}, it is not
clear that Frege's [1893] explanation of the universal quantifier does yield a
proposition. (yVxeD)A has to be a proposition when D is a set and A is a preposi-
tional function over D, that is, /4eProp, provided that xeD. Under the same assump-
tions, Frege then (essentially) defines
The True, if A[a/x] = The True, provided aeD.
(IE) (VxeD)A =def <
. The False, otherwise.15
This definitional equality, however, is not auswertbar to primitive form. To my
mind, this way of framing the intuitionistic undecidability criticism of classical
logic is the most satisfactory: what is wrong with the classical position is that it
allows for non-eliminable defined notions. In other words, it is not clear that the
formation-rule for the quantifier preserves meaningfulness.16
Intuitionism is a foundationalism.17 Mathematical language has content.18 This
holds true also for the practice of Brouwer: mathematical language reports the
carrying out of constructions within "mathematical intuition".19 Thus, language is
held accountable to the mathematics it describes. In particular, logic is not prior to
the acts of construction in which theorems are proved. It is not so that a set of fixed
and ready principles are all-applicable, irrespective of subject-matter, or chosen
domain of quantification. The laws of logic are not applied in mathematics: on the
contrary, the principles of logic are read off from the practice of constructive
mathematics. This view, together with the fact that intuitionistic mathematical
practice eschews the use of non-constructive methods, constitutes a negative
criticism of the traditional classical mathematical foundationalism as set out in the
equation (*) above. In the early thirties Heyting and Kolmogorov provided (what
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turned out to be) equivalent elucidations of the notion of a proposition within
constructive mathematics: a proposition is a set of proof-objects and a proof of the
proposition is an element of the set of proof-objects.20 The truth of the proposition
is equated with the existence of a proof, that is
proposition A is true = there exists a proof of A.
One has the right to assert the theorem
A is true
only when one has found a proof-object
ceA.
What is here at issue is Λ proof of a proposition. From a philosophical point of view
this is one of the foremost innovations that we owe to Brouwer's intuitionism (and
the explicit semantical formulations of Heyting). Previously, also in the non-
constructive tradition, a proof was always a proof of a theorem, that is, an assertion
that a certain proposition is true. Accordingly, in view of this novel conception of
proof, we might do well to observe also a terminological distinction and use
'proof(-object)! for proofs of propositions and 'demonstration' for proofs of
theorems.
Both the classical position and its intuitionistic rival are "foundationalisms":
mathematical theorems have content. Indeed, as was already noted, the classical
tradition operated according to the equation (*) above. However, also the
intuitionist can accept (*), but with a changed order of priorities. For him, mathe-
matics cannot be held accountable to a fixed and prior (classical) logic. On the
contrary, the validity of logical principles depend on the possibilities of constructing
mathematical objects. In foundations of mathematics, when formal languages were
used, from Frege onwards, until Heyting, they were invariably provided with
careful meaning-explanations, or at least such explanations were attempted. Frege
[1893, §§ 29-31] wanted to show that every expression that can be formed within
his "concept script" has meaning and that the demonstrated theorems are true.
Similarly, one fruitful way to view Wittgenstein's Tractatus is as an attempt to
provide the missing semantical framework for Principia Mathematica. These
attempts at a semantical foundation for mathematical language were clearly extra-
mathematical; owing to the universality of the mathematical languages for which
semantical treatments had to be given, there was no place inside mathematics where
this could be done. Indeed, Frege is aware of a 'peculiar obstacle' at this point
which forces him to ask his reader to be satisfied with pinches of salt (Körnchen
Salz) and hints (Winke), whereas Wittgenstein superimposes an elaborate frame-
work of internal relations in order to deal with the ineffability of semantics. Only
with the advent of the model-theoretical perspective during the 1920's does this
change and the study of formalisms without a content becomes the order of the day.
Jean van Heijenoort [1967] first drew attention to the distinction between these two
conceptions of logic. Jaakko Hintikka has redeployed van Heijenoort's distinction
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as one applying primarily to language. His version of the distinction holds between
Language as the Universal Medium and Language as Calculus and he has been
much concerned to propagate its importance.21
Logic as Language Logic as Calculus
( 1 ) Foundational aims
(2) Interpreted object-language for
proving theorems in
(3) |— is an "assertion-sign" .
Metamathematical aims
Metamathematical object-language
for proving theorems about
\— is a theorem-predicate.22
In order to get a picture of how the distinction works out it is convenient to locate
a number of well-known logicians and foundational researchers within the two
paradigms.23
Logic as Language Logic as Calculus
Frege*
Russell*
Wittgenstein*
Carnap* (Abriss)
Heyting*
Church [1932]
Lesniewski
Tarski Wahrheitsbegriff'(1933)
Scholz, Friedrich Bachmann
Quine [1934]
Hubert
Carnap (Syntax)
Kreisel, Goodman
Lukasiewicz
Tarski Nachwort [1935]
The traditional view of the mathematical Grundlagenstreit is that it was a three-
cornered fight between three independent positions - logicism, intuitionism, and
formalism - without much common ground. Consideration of the two themes that
have been dealt with above, namely, the controversy concerning the unlimited use
of classical logic, and the division form/content with respect to mathematical
language, suggest another, perhaps more realistic picture. It is obtained by crossing
the two dichotomies.
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Three of the four options are readily filled; the fourth, which would study
contentless languages while rejecting classical logic, appears lacking in motivation.
After all, the rejection of classical reasoning is based, not on knee-jerk revulsion,
but on the reasoned insight that the intuitionistic meaning-explanations do not
validate the classical laws, together with the fact that at present no meaning expla-
nations are known that serve to make evident the laws of classical mathematics. But
if one abandons content, why make life more difficult than it is? If meaning no
longer imposes inconvenient constraints, why force oneself into an intuitionistic
strait-jacket?
The Grundlagenstreit
View of Language
Universal Medium
Calculus
Classical Logic
/
Acceptance
Logicism
Formalism
\
Rejection
Intutitionism
The abandonment of logicism as a viable position within the foundations of mathe-
matics, after the last-ditch stand by Ramsey [1926] and Carnap [1931], comes as
no surprise: their valiant efforts, as well as that of the Tractatus, simply fail to make
evident the rules and axioms of Principia Mathematica. The axioms of infinity,
choice and reducibility remain problematic. Formalism is able to take over
logicism's role as torch-bearer for classical logic only by means of a strategic retreat
into the contentless pure forms of the calculus-conception of language.
Karl Menger spent some years at Amsterdam as Brouwer's assistant and he
wrote a revealing memoir [1979] concerning his experiences there. In thought-
provoking articles [1928, 1930], written after his return to Vienna as Associate
Professor of Geometry, Menger noted that constructivity comes in degrees - a point
subsequently elaborated by Bernays [1935] - and objected strongly to founding
mathematics on "intuition", in place of which he preferred "implicationism":
All that matters is into which statements certain others can be transformed by the use of
given transformation rules. Attempts to found the acceptance or rejection of propositions ...
on intuition are ultimately empty words.24
Menger's hostility is surely caused in part by the ambiguity of the terms Intuition,
and intuitive. Three relevant readings, at least, can be discerned:
(i) Vague, non-scientific, founded upon feeling rather than reason;
(ii) An English rendition of Kantian Anschauung ;
iNTUrnONISM AND LOGICAL TOLERANCE 143
(iii) Non-discursive, immediate rather than mediate, not grounded in
reasoning.25
Menger thinks in terms of meaning (i), whereas Brouwer's meaning is a combina-
tion of (ii) and (iii): mathematical theorems must be proved directly in the Kantian
intuition of time by means of evident construction-steps, and not via a detour
through logic.
For the Vienna Circle the dichotomies analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteri-
ori had to coincide. In particular, according to them, there was no synthetic a priori
in mathematics, whether founded in intuition or not. Brouwer's criticism of classi-
cal reasoning, and his providing a (more or less) viable alternative, with its different
conception of logic, rendered an uncritical foundationalism with respect to classical
mathematics untenable. Similarly, to found analyticity on what is true in (virtue of)
classical logic is no longer very attractive, when the basis on which the whole
foundational edifice would presumably rest is no longer undisputed. Carnap's first
way out of his dilemma [1931] was to meet the challenge by biting the Brouwerian
bullet, but his attempt at providing an adequate foundation for classical logic
remained unconvincing, though. Shortly afterwards [1934, p. xv], therefore, he
abandons foundationalism for mathematical language - be it classical or not - and
follows the path taken by Menger. The conception of language as a universal
medium is firmly rejected and the calculus perspective on logic and language is
adopted:
Up to now, in constructing a language the procedure has usually been, first assign a meaning
to the fundamental mathematico-logical symbols, and then to consider what sentences and
inferences are seen to be logically correct in accordance with this meaning....
The connection will only become clear when approached from the opposite direction:
let any postulates and rules be chosen arbitrarily; then this choice, whatever it may be, will
determine what meaning is to be assigned to the fundamental logical symbols.
How, we may ask, does Carnap know that every choice, 'whatever it may be', does
indeed determine meaning? Why cannot simply nonsense result from arbitrary
postulation? Camap expressed his admiration for the early, but old-fashioned,
foundationalist attempts at laying down meanings and asserting the mathematical
axioms and logical principles of inference that are analytically self-evident accord-
ing to the meanings thus explained. These attempts
were certainly bold ones,.... But they were hampered by the striving after 'correctness'.
Now, however, that impediment has been overcome, and before us lies the boundless ocean
of unlimited possibilities.
The result is the "Language as Calculus" conception with a vengeance: "By a
language we mean here in general any sort of calculus, ,.."26
Meaning is no longer of primary importance for mathematical language; what
matters are the rules of transformation only, and, if meanings there be, they have
to be read off from, or are superimposed by, those very rules of transformation. The
Grundlagenstreit is resolved by telling the protagonists to go away:
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Principle of Tolerance. It is not our business to set up prohibitions, but to arrive at conven-
tions. ...
In logic, there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic ... as he
wishes.27
It is interesting to note that Caraap makes heavy play with the notion of analyticity.
In the traditional sense axioms have to be analytic in the sense of self-evident truths.
The evidence of a traditional axiom is immediate, rather than mediate. The knowl-
edge expressed rests upon nothing else: it must be grounded solely in the concepts
that occur in the axiom in question. Kant's analytic judgements of the form [S is P],
where the predicate is contained in the subject, are prime examples here. Such
analyticity is unthinkable without content. According to the scholastic tags axioms
have to bepropositioper se nota and their evidence is evidentia ex vi terminorum.
A close analogue in the Tractatus is that of elucidatory ascriptions of internal
properties and relations: when P is an internal property of a, a grasp of a and P
alone suffices for getting to the insight that a has the property P.28 Carnap is
concerned to show that the laws of logic are analytic in a certain formal istic sense
involving suitable transformation rules.29 This notion is not the formalistic counter-
part of the above traditional notion of analyticity. It is patterned on another notion
which goes back to Bolzano and was used by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, namely
that of a proposition which is logically true, come what may, independently of what
is the case.
Camap's Principle of Tolerance, in my opinion, simply does not even begin to
engage the issues; it merely avoids them. Such formalistic tolerance leaves every-
thing the way it is. A genuinely interesting case ofcontentual tolerance is provided
by Gödel, who could move back and forth between intuitionism and platonist set
theory, apparently without effort.30 The list of his contributions to intuitionism is
long and impressive: the double-negation interpretation, the modal translation, no
finitely many-valued truth-tables, the Zilsel-lecture, and the Dialectica-interpreta-
tion.
Camap's struggle with classical content was witnessed at close distance by the
young Gödel, and according to Menger, the latter was sympathetic to the earlier
tolerance-related ideas of Menger.31 Content, however, seems to have been central
to Gödel's philosophical position as evidenced by his (late) affinity to Husserl's
phenomenology. Be that as it may: the mature logician wanted no truck with the
tolerance principle. Menger's implicationism is refuted in the Gibbs lecture [1951,
p. 310, fn. 16], whereas the aborted Schilpp-paper on Carnap can be seen as one
long attempt to bury the calculus-conception of language decisively.32
Gödel's early reactions were not less impressive. I know of no better way to
conclude this inventory of the intuitionistic provocation, which made Carnap seek
refuge in anodyne tolerance, than to contrast Camap's own reaction with Gödel's
response to Brouwer's Vienna lecture [1929]. Carnap's report on Gödel's views
'about the inexhaustibility of mathematics' takes the form of an diary-entry. His
extraordinary passage epitomises most 20th century lines of development within
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logic and the foundations of mathematics with marvellous clarity and precision, and
I leave it to speak for itself without further comment:
We admit as legitimate mathematics certain reflections on the grammar of a language that
contains the empirical. If one seeks to formalize such a mathematics, then with each formal-
ization there are problems, which one can understand and express in ordinary language, but
cannot express in the given formalized language. It follows (Brouwer) that mathematics is
inexhaustible: one must always again draw afresh from the 'fountain of intuition'. There is
therefore no characteristica uni versai is for the whole of mathematics, and no decision
procedure for the whole of mathematics. In each and every closed language there are only
countably many expressions. The continuum appears only in 'the whole of mathematics.'...
If we have only one language, and can only make 'elucidations' about it, then these elucida-
tions are inexhaustible, they always require some new intuition again.33
NOTES
1. Cantor f 1882, p. 114] (my italics). I am indebted to Per Martin-Lof for drawing my attention to
this passage. The link - Art des Gegebenseins - from Cantor to Frege should not be overlooked.
2. The term Begriffssphäre occurs in Kant's (Jäsche-) Logik, §8: the "sphere" of a concept is
explained as its extension. Accordingly it seems that what Cantor is here explaining is what it is
for a set of natural numbers, or of reals, or of complex numbers, or whatever the case may be,
according to the choice of the relevant concept-sphere. Alternatively, the concept-sphere might
be seen as the set-theoretic universe, which, as Cantor reported in some famous letters to
Dedekind [1899], is not a set, but eine inkonsistente Vielheit.
3. [1908, § 1.3, § 1.6, Axiom ΙΠ, pp. 263-264].
4. [1903, § 56, p. 69].
5. That one runs into the Church-Turing undecidability theorem at this point was unknown when the
Tractatus was written.
6. This diagram is an elaboration of one found in Martin-Lof [1987].
7. Bolzano [1837, § 34] is quite explicit on this point.
8. For instance, in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein reduced prepositional truth yet one step further, to the
obtaining of the ontological state-of-affairs (Sachverhalt) that is presented by the (elementary)
proposition in question, and that, in turn, to "reality" (Wirklichkeit) (2.06).
9. Kronecker [1882].
10. RH is Kreisel's [1958] arithmetical Πι formulation of the Riemann Hypothesis.
11. The verification consists of repeated applications of V-elimination: one major with respect to R(x,
y), with subsidiary applications with respect to R(x, y' ), using (the constructively valid) modus
tollens in order to reject the unwanted alternative in each case.
12. [1906, p. 316].
13. HereA:=X.
14. The classical notion of a proposition (Fregean Gedanke [= way of presenting a truth-value]) is
unclear. In particular, the relevant notion of identity between propositions is problematic (cf. my
"Proof-theoretical semantics and Fregean identity criteria for propositions". The Monist 77 (1994),
pp. 294-314.). Per Martin-Löf pointed out to me that on the classical Ramsey semantics, which
puts
prop = Boole = {true,false}e Set,
there is, constructively speaking, nothing amiss with quantification over all propositions, since
proposotional quantisation comes down to quantification over a finite, in fact two-element, set:
(VXeprop)A = A[true/X] & A[false/X\.
Thus the problem is to provide a joint validation for quantification over propositions as well as
quantification with respect to an infinite domain. Constructively, quantification with respect to
infinite domains is made good sense of, but quantification over propositions has to be rejected
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owing to impredicativity. For classical semantics, on the other hand, owing to the very narrow
concept of a proposition as a truth-value, quantification over all propositions is also constructively
acceptable, but the validation of, say, universal quantifier-formation (with respect to an infinite
set) has not been given.
15. Frege's does not include the set D as domain of quantification since he quantifies over all
individual objects.
16. This way of understanding Brouwer's criticisism was hinted at by Martin-Löf [1985, p. 33]. I
have come to appreciate it through the lucid advocacy of Aarne Ranta [1994, p. 38]. See also my
[1994a, p. 153].
17. The term 'foundationalism' has been used by Shaprio [1991], but then in a slightly pejorative
sense, which I cannot share. To my mind, 'foundations without foundationalism' are no
foundations.
18. Van Heijenoort [1976, p. 46] notes that 'Brouwer was certainly concerned with meaning' (in
which opinion I concur, even though I would prefer content to 'meaning'), and continues: 'In fact,
a great part of his polemics against Hubert turned around the notion of Inhalt. But neither he nor
Heyting thought of systematising the notion.' The first sentence of this quote is certainly correct.
Van Heijenoort does not give references, but Brouwer [1927, §1, p. 375] is as good a place as
any. I want to take exception to the second sentence, though. Heyting, did not merely think of
systematising content from an intuitionistic point of view, but, as witnessed by his semantical
works, actually carried out such a systématisation.
19. Brouwer's theory of language, as set out, e.g., in [1929] was less charitable. There mathematical
activity is deemed to be 'languageless'. So often, deeds speak more than words, though. In
practice, also that of Brouwer, language is indispensable. For instance, how to deal with, say, the
theory of countable large constructive ordinals in a constructive, but languageless, fashion,
without recourse to elaborate linguistic notation-systems, is completely unclear.
20. I have dealt with the formulations of Heyting and Kolmogorov in a number of places, for instance,
[1983, 1993, 1994].
21. See Hintikka [1988], and also the recent [1996], which collects his deployments of the distinction.
I share Hintikka's view concerning its importance and applaud his efforts to make it known and
appreciated; only, my sympathies lie with Language as a Universal Medium rather than as a
Calculus.
22. Kusch [1988] gives a very clear presentation of the dichotomy between the two conceptions of
language in terms of eight characteristic theses l/niversal Medium 1 - UM 8, that are opposed to
a matching Calculus-series of theses.
23. An asterisk here indicates that the logician in question used the turnstile essentially as a Fregean
assertion sign.
24. Menger [1928, p.57]
25. A fourth meaning, that might be relevant to current discussions of mathematical intuition by
Charles Parsons and others, is that of "non-reflective skill, or insight, obtained through thorough
practice within an area."
Cooking at the highest level is almost purely intuitive,
would be an example of such a use.
26. Carnap [1934, p. 167].
27. Carnap [1934, p. 51-52].
28. See my [1990] for an elaboration of this point.
29. Carnap's [1934] treatment shows considerable constructivist influence. See, for example §§ 15,
16, 43, 44.
30. Gödel is one of the few logicians that uphold the traditional notions of analyticity [1944, p. 151]
and evidence [1972, p. 275, note h, 1].
31. Godel 'supported me with a nod of assent', Karl Menger [1979, p. 13] reports.
32. [1953/9-ΠΙ] and [1953/9-V].
33. Carnap, Diary, December 23, 1929. Quoted from Wang [1987, pp. 50, 84].
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